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Napoleon Bonaparte’s Concordat and the French Revolution
Abstract
In 1815, Napoleon Bonaparte and Pope Pius XVII signed an agreement called the Concordat, which was
an agreement between the French state and the Catholic Church that reconciled the Church with the antireligious policies established during the French Revolution. This paper discusses the conflicting
viewpoints held by various historians concerning the legacy of the Concordat; that is, did the agreement
fulfill the religious goals of the early revolutionaries or did it betray their ideals? Ultimately, the paper
concludes that the Concordat did indeed uphold the religious principles established during the early
stages of the Revolution.
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Napoleon Bonaparte’s Concordat and the French Revolution
Kristy Hosack
On July 15, 1801, Napoleon Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII signed an
agreement called the Concordat; this document influenced the relationship
between church and state in France for the next century. The Concordat
attempted to reconcile the religious conflicts that had plagued France since the
beginning of the French Revolution in 1789. During the Liberal Phase of the
Revolution from 1789 to 1792, the revolutionary governments took measures
to reform the Roman Catholic Church and the relationship between church and
state. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy of 1790 carried out many of these
reforms by establishing the Constitutional Church. The principal
accomplishments of the Liberal Phase of the Revolution included bringing the
Church under state control, establishing religious tolerance, abolishing the
privileges of the Church under the Ancien Régime, selling the Church’s land to
raise money for the state, and subjecting the selection of bishops to popular
elections. Bonaparte’s Concordat and the accompanying Organic Articles
maintained the accomplishments of the Revolution’s Liberal Phase through
their provisions and stipulations. The Revolution became much more radical
from 1793 to 1794, and the government in power completely abolished
Catholicism; the government that followed this period, the Directory, legally
separated church and state. While the later stages of the Revolution are
important, the early phase of the Revolution is the main focus of this paper, as
there are much stronger corollaries between its religious policies and those
established by the Concordat. As a number of historians argue, the Concordat
preserved the achievements of the Liberal Revolution because it maintained
many of its most important accomplishments. Other historians, however, argue
that the Concordat destroyed the gains of the early Revolution and even
strengthened the Church at the expense of the state, but their principal
arguments are unsubstantiated. Thus, while the Concordat did not preserve
every single religious accomplishment of the Revolution, overall, it protected
and maintained the religious decisions and achievements of the early
revolutionaries.
Bonaparte recognized that it was important to end the religious
conflicts in France and to establish peace within the country; after all, the
relationship between the Church and the French state was almost nonexistent
when he came to power. Bonaparte was not a religious man, but he was aware
of the social role that religion played in society. He recognized that religion
was an important way to achieve social stability. In this way, he and the leader
of the government during the subsequent Radical Phase of the Revolution,
Maximilian Robespierre, shared similar viewpoints, for Robespierre also
understood the important social role that religion played. Robespierre himself
was a deist, but he insisted on establishing a state religion, the Cult of the
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Supreme Being, which would act as a social pacifier. However, whereas prior
revolutionary leaders and governments were not successful in establishing a
long-term, acceptable relationship between the Catholic Church and the French
nation, Bonaparte achieved success because of his willingness to cooperate.
Bonaparte was able to strike a balance between the two major camps of
religious thought: radical anti-clericalism versus extreme loyalty to the Catholic
Church. This ability to compromise allowed him to establish an agreement that
remained in effect for more than a century.
Bonaparte and Pope Pius XVII finalized the Concordat in 1815
after nearly a year of negotiations. The agreement recognized Catholicism as
“the religion of the great majority of citizens,” and the clergy (the bishops and
the parish priests) became employees of the
1
state. In addition, the Concordat permitted the establishment of seminaries,
although the state would not fund them. The agreement also required all clergy
to take an oath of loyalty to the government and to say prayers for the state at
the end of each mass. Furthermore, the state received the power to appoint
bishops, who subsequently were allowed to appoint the parish priests. The
Concordat also included papal recognition and acceptance of the Church lands
that had been confiscated by the state and sold during the Revolution. After
Bonaparte’s government initially opposed the Concordat, he added a series of
stipulations called the Organic Articles, which subjected the clergy to more
restrictions and government supervision.
Historians are divided as to whether the Concordat and the Organic
Articles upheld the laws and regulations established during the Revolution’s
Liberal Phase. For example, many historians argue that the Concordat actually
increased papal authority and influence in France, which the revolutionaries
had tried to prevent. Historian Louis Madelin argues that the very fact that
Bonaparte, as the head of a republic, consulted the Pope and included him in
2
negotiations serves as proof of increased papal influence. After all, the
National Assembly did not consult the Pope when they crafted the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy.
The reorganization of the episcopate is another area where some
historians argue that papal influence was increased. Madelin argues that the
Pope received an “astounding increase of authority” when Bonaparte gave him
the right to dismiss the bishops that had been consecrated prior to the
3
Revolution. Historian Robert B. Holtman also argues that this provision gave
1
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the Pope “more power over the clergy in France than he had ever held
4
during the ancient régime, and more power over bishops.” To these historians,
this power was significant because it set a precedent for further papal
interference: if he could dismiss those bishops, then he might be able to
dismiss others in the future and thus have a significant amount of influence
over the Catholic Church in France. Historians such as David Laven and Lucy
Riall also point to the fact that while Bonaparte appointed the new bishops, the
Pope had the right to invest them with their spiritual authority, which gave the
5
Pope a power he had not enjoyed before the French Revolution. In addition,
Holtman notes that because the Concordat did not mention monastic orders, it
effectively gave permission for new religious orders to be established that
would owe “their allegiance to the Pope directly,” instead of to the French
6
government; this further increased the Pope’s authority. Thus, historian Frank
McLynn concludes that the “attempt by the Revolution to exclude the French
7
Church from papal influence had manifestly failed.” Instead, McLynn argues,
8
the Concordat established a precedent for further influence and interventions.
McLynn also argues that the Concordat abandoned Revolutionary
principles and accomplishments when it gave the state the authority to choose
9
bishops, who would then choose the parish priests. After all, this was
fundamentally different from the Constitutional Church under the Revolution,
which had given the people the right to democratically elect their clergy.
Historians such as Georges Lefebvre also assert that Bonaparte and the new
bishops allowed counter-revolutionary clergy to dominate Church offices, given
that the Concordat “did not specify any specially reserved places for the
10
constitutional bishops.” Such historians argue that this conflicted with the
fact that only Constitutional bishops had held Church posts during the
Revolution, for the government had dismissed all counter-revolutionary
bishops who had refused to swear an oath of obedience. Likewise, Madelin
argues that by dismissing the bishops of the Constitutional Church and
primarily replacing them with counter-revolutionary clergy, the Concordat
4

Robert B. Holtman, The Napoleonic Revolution: Critical Periods of
History (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1967), 133.
5
David Laven and Lucy Riall, Napoleon’s Legacy: Problems of
Government in Restoration Europe (Oxford, United Kingdom: Berg Publishers,
2000), 219.
6
Holtman, The Napoleonic Revolution, 133.
7
Frank McLynn, Napoleon: a Biography (New York: Arcade
Publishing, 2002), 248.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid., 246-47.
10
Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon: from 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799-1807
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 139.

33
effectively abolished the Constitutional Church. Therefore, Madelin
concludes that the Concordat did not preserve an important accomplishment
11
of the Revolution.
On the other hand, there are also many historians who maintain that
the Concordat preserved the gains of the Revolution. For example, historian
Martyn Lyons argues that the Concordat conserved the principles of religious
tolerance established by the early revolutionaries. He asserts that because the
Concordat did not claim that Catholicism was the established religion of France,
it firmly established the principle of religious tolerance by depriving the
12
Catholic Church of its monopoly on religion. In addition, by extending
tolerance to Protestants, the Concordat “preserved the principle of religious
13
toleration which the Revolution had established.” Historian Nigel Aston adds
that the Concordat gave the Calvinists and Lutherans much more legal
recognition, thereby preserving the policy of tolerance as a “lasting fruit of the
14
Revolution.”
Furthermore, Lyons emphasizes that in making the clergy salaried
employees of the state, the Concordat fulfilled what “the Civil Constitution of
the Clergy of 1790 had intended,” which was to bring the clergy under state
15
control and reduce papal authority. Lyons asserts that because all bishops
and approximately 35,000 parish priests would receive their salaries from the
state, the government would have significant control over their actions.
Historian David Jan Sorkin also points out that because the Concordat gave the
state the right to appoint the bishops instead of the Pope, it “subjected the
16
Church to even greater state supervision.” In addition, historians assert that
the Organic Articles contributed to the reduction in papal authority, for the
Articles limited the actions of the bishops and tightened the state’s control
over the Church. Lyons argues that these Articles “amounted to a
17
strengthening of centralised authority at the expense of the helpless Papacy.”
In addition, Sorkin maintains that the Articles preserved the independence of
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the state from Church authority. Thus, according to these historians, the
Concordat and its Articles significantly weakened the Pope’s authority.
Furthermore, Lyons maintains that the Church did not regain its
privileged status with the Concordat, which is what the early revolutionaries
had wanted. First, the newly-drawn diocesan boundaries eliminated
inequalities that had existed under the Ancien Régime and instead adhered to
reason and rationality. As Lyons declares, under the Ancien Régime, “a few very
rich bishoprics contrasted with a multitude of small and poorer ones,” but
19
because of the Concordat, these “inequalities had definitely disappeared.” In
addition, because the Church received no tax exemptions or special privileges,
Lyons asserts that it no longer held a special position within the state and
instead was subject to government control, “just as the National Assembly had
20
intended.” Also, historians such as Susan P. Conner emphasize that the
Concordat legalized the land transfers conducted during the Revolution,
thereby adhering to “the principles of the Revolution” by eliminating a principle
21
source of the Church’s wealth.
Thus, it is clear that significant controversy exists concerning the
legacy of the Concordat. Although both camps of historians make compelling
arguments, the Concordat did in fact preserve the accomplishments of the
early revolutionaries.
The French Revolution acknowledged the right of the French people to
participate in any religion that they wanted. At the beginning of the Revolution
in 1789, the Declaration of Rights of Man established the principle of religious
tolerance. The Declaration states that no one “may be disturbed for his
opinions, even in religion,” and the Constitution of 1781 included this
22
guarantee. As historians Stewart Jay Brown and Timothy Tackett point out, by
the end of 1789, Protestants had been granted complete political and civil
23
rights. For the most part, the Concordat upheld this legacy of tolerance. In
fact, as historian Alexander Grab points out, Pope Pius XVII wanted the
Concordat to declare that Catholicism was the official religion of France, but
Bonaparte refused to do so, “thereby preserving religious pluralism in
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France.” In addition, the Organic Articles attached to the Concordat also
protected the rights of these two groups of Protestants; for example, the
25
Articles forbade the Catholic clergy from insulting other religions. This serves
as further proof that the Concordat maintained the establishment of religious
tolerance. While Bonaparte did not grant Jewish people religious tolerance
with the Concordat, the early revolutionaries had not done so either. But, the
Concordat did succeed in putting Lutheranism, the main religion that competed
with Catholicism, on equal legal footing with the Catholic Church, and it did not
grant the Pope a monopoly on religion in France. Thus, the Concordat fully
implemented the Revolutionary principle of religious tolerance.
Another important gain of the French Revolution was the abolition of
Church privilege and decadence. Under the Ancien Régime, the Church owned
a large amount of land, was exempt from taxes, and collected tithes from all
French citizens. However, the actions of the revolutionaries, such as abolishing
the tithe on August 11, 1789 and selling some of the Church’s land, signaled
that the historical inequalities were no longer acceptable. The Concordat
maintained the Revolution’s abolition of privilege in several ways. First, it
declared that while Catholics could make endowments to the Church if they
desired to do so, tithing was not mandatory. While the stipulation was a
compromise between the Ancien Régime and the Revolutionary government, it
ultimately favored the Revolution because the French citizens now had the
right to choose if they wished to tithe or not.
The Concordat also upheld another important Revolutionary gain
concerning privilege: the sale of Church lands. On November 2, 1789, the
National Assembly confiscated all income-producing Church lands and later
sold the lands in order to raise money for the French state. While this was
primarily done for financial reasons, it also reflected a desire to prevent the
Church from maintaining inequitable economic privileges. Under the National
Assembly, the Church no longer owned a significant portion of the land in
France nor was it able to generate income from its land. The Concordat
maintained this Revolutionary gain by declaring that neither the Pope nor his
successors would “disturb in any manner those who have acquired alienated
26
ecclesiastical possessions.” Although Bonaparte promised to compensate the
Church for its losses, he made it clear that the compensation would be nothing
more than a small amount. Therefore it is true, as Lyons argues, that the
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Church was now an institution that “enjoyed no special privileges.” Thus,
because the Concordat legalized and secured the sale of the Church lands, it
protected one of the most important gains of the Revolution concerning
Church privilege.
In addition, the Concordat followed the revolutionaries’ model of
rational reconstruction of diocesan boundaries, which subsequently restricted
inequalities of privilege within the Church itself. The National Assembly had
redrawn the diocesan boundaries and had reduced the number of dioceses to
83, in accordance with the 83 newly created departments. The Concordat also
adhered to the principle of rationality established by the Revolution and
reorganized the diocesan boundaries even further, creating only 50 total
dioceses. As Lyons asserts, because of this rational reorganization, the small
number of wealthy bishoprics that had existed in the Ancien Régime were
28
effectively eliminated. Because of this reorganization, it was no longer
possible for certain clergymen to enrich themselves simply because of the
location or size of their bishopric. Thus, the privileges of certain clergymen
were fully eliminated, thereby removing another source of inequality within
the Church, as the liberal revolutionaries had intended.
The Concordat also upheld the Revolutionary ideal of limiting papal
authority. The revolutionaries in France had given the state greater control
over the Church and reduced the authority of Rome, for, as Lyons asserts, one
of the essential components of the Revolution’s religious policies was “full
29
government control over the French clergy” and the Church as a whole.
During the Revolution, this was accomplished primarily through the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy. As historians Sidney Z. Ehler and John B. Morrall
argue, “The clear aim of the Constitution was to cut off the French Church, for
30
all practical purposes, from contact with Rome.” The Civil Constitution of the
Clergy provided for the citizens to elect their bishops and parish priests, and it
also made the clergy employees of the government, which would pay their
salaries. The Constitution greatly reduced the Pope’s authority, for he no longer
had any say in the selection of the clergy. The state would maintain complete
control of the Church, for, as Lefebvre argues, “[f]ar from planning to separate
Church and state, [the revolutionaries] dreamed of bringing the two more
31
closely together.” The Concordat accomplished this goal in several ways; for
example, the Concordat gave the state the authority to name the bishops
27
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instead of the Pope, whose only role in the matter would be to sanctify the
nominees. The Concordat also mandated that the state pay the salaries of the
clergy, which effectively made all clergymen state employees, and therefore
subject to state authority. Because clergymen were to receive their pay and in
many cases, their appointments, from the state, they had no choice but to be
obedient and loyal to Bonaparte and his government instead of to the Pope.
Equally important in reducing papal authority were the Organic
Articles that Bonaparte added to the Concordat, which undeniably
32
strengthened “secular authority over the clergy,” as Lyons asserts. Among
other provisions, the Articles mandated that no papal bull be published without
the government’s permission, that any representatives of the Pope visiting
France had to get the consent of the French government before they could
perform their duties, and that no French bishops could leave their dioceses
without permission from the government. The Articles even required state
approval in order to establish the dates of religious holidays. Aston argues that
Bonaparte “had no intention of allowing the Pope to assume a greater status in
the post-Concordat order than he had possessed before 1790,” and that the
Organic Articles made it clear that “the state would have the final word, …
33
leaving the clergy dependent on the government.” Indeed, the Articles placed
authority over the Church firmly in the hands of the state, for the Church could
hardly do a thing without clear approval from the government. This meant that
the state, represented by Bonaparte, would be able to always know what the
Church was doing and would have a legal way to interfere if he did not like the
Church’s actions or decisions.
However, other historians disagree, and instead argue that the
Concordat actually strengthened papal authority and influence in France. They
argue that because the Pope had the right to dismiss the current bishops and
because he was also trusted with investing the bishops appointed by Bonaparte
with their spiritual authority, the power of the Papacy was increased. They also
cite the monastic orders and assert that these fell under the sole jurisdiction of
the Pope, given that the Concordat does not mention them at all. However,
with the exception of the monastic orders, these are arguments that support
the claim that the power of the Papacy increased symbolically. After all, the
Pope received no practical gains from dismissing the bishops, nor did he
acquire any real power from endowing the clergy with their spiritual authority.
Lyons also points out that the French bishops were not willing to grant the
Pope more authority, for they were increasingly “jealous of papal
encroachments on their powers” and even argued that they received their
34
authority “directly from God,” not the Pope. Thus, even had the Concordat
32
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38
not reduced papal authority, it is arguable that the bishops would have done
so themselves, for they were determined to guard their own power and not let
the Pope exert too much influence over them and their dioceses. Also, even
though historians like McLynn argue that the Pope now had a precedent for
dismissing bishops or otherwise interfering in the future, I would argue that
this is not true. Unique circumstances compelled Bonaparte to allow the Pope
to exercise this power. The pope only had the right to dismiss that particular
group of bishops, for Bonaparte did not allow further papal intervention in the
future. In addition, the fact that the Pope had influence over the monastic
orders is not significant. After all, the monastic orders played no important role
in society, for Bonaparte had removed their influence in education with the
creation of his own schools, the lycées. Thus, despite these arguments, it is still
clear that the Concordat reduced papal influence.
In addition, historians such as Madelin, Holtman, and McLynn believe
that the Concordat’s method of appointing new bishops did not coincide with
the revolutionaries’ treatment of the bishops. They argue that the dismissal of
the current Constitutional bishops and the installation of bishops with a wide
range of political beliefs contradicted the Revolution’s practice of only
accepting clergy who were in favor of the Revolution. However, I would argue
that the policies established by the Concordat did not completely break away
from this practice. In fact, according to historian Frank J. Coppa, Bonaparte
nominated sixteen bishops from the Ancien Régime, twelve from the
Constitutional Church, and thirty-two unaffiliated priests. As Coppa argues, this
shows that Bonaparte “selected his new hierarchy in accordance with his
35
principals of amalgamation to avoid the appearance of favoring any party.”
That is, Bonaparte did not favor one group of priests over another. Coppa also
asserts that Bonaparte compelled the new bishops to reserve a number of
positions, such as canons, vicar-generals, pastors, and curates, for
36
constitutional clergy. Therefore, while the Concordat allowed nonConstitutional priests to serve and thus did not fully preserve an important
Revolutionary tradition, Bonaparte made up for it by not favoring one clerical
position over the other in his choice of clergy.
Another gain of the Revolution that the Concordat arguably did not
preserve was the popular election of priests and bishops. The revolutionaries of
the Liberal Phase allowed French citizens to choose their own bishops and
parish priests through a series of elections, thus maintaining, as Malcolm Crook
asserts, the early revolutionaries’ “passionate advocacy of popular
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participation.” In contrast to this democratic procedure, the Concordat
gave the state the right to choose the bishops, who would then select the
priests. As historians such as Frank McLynn and Georges Lefebvre argue, the
Concordat thus destroyed a fundamentally democratic aspect of the
Revolution, for it gave the state the right to make decisions instead of the
French citizens. However, as Crook points out in his recent study, the election
of priests during the early Revolution actually took place in two stages. Nearly
everyone got to vote in the first phase, but in order to qualify for the second
stage, voters had to meet certain fiscal requirements, such as having paid taxes
38
that were the equivalent of ten days’ wages. Thus, as Crook argues, “the
electoral colleges were composed of members of the wealthy elites,” instead of
39
average citizens. Therefore, instead of being a democratic process, the voting
procedures were actually highly selective and exclusionary, at the expense of
the common people that McLynn and other historians think were enfranchised
during the early Revolution. In that regard, the Concordat did not infringe upon
the revolutionary democratic tradition. In addition, I would argue that
democracy and popular participation were not the principal goals of the early
revolutionaries, and that empowering the state at the expense of the Church
was more important to them. In this regard, giving the state, although
represented by Napoleon, the right to choose the bishops achieved this goal,
even though democracy might have suffered.
Thus, the Concordat was neither purely revolutionary nor completely
influenced by the Ancien Régime. Ultimately, however, the Concordat
preserved most of the accomplishments achieved by the revolutionaries of the
Liberal Phase of the French Revolution. Even though some historians argue that
the Concordat did not uphold the Revolution and argue, for example, that it
increased papal authority or abolished revolutionary gains, their arguments are
not valid. On the other hand, other historians assert that the Concordat’s
provisions did, in fact, maintain the accomplishments and the spirit of the early
revolutionaries, and it is these historians who have stronger arguments. After
all, both the Concordat and the Liberal Phase of the Revolution increased state
authority at the expense of the Church, supported the principle of religious
tolerance, and diminished the privileges and inequitable wealth of the Church.
Thus, the Concordat effectively preserved the gains of the Liberal Phase of the
Revolution and upheld its principals and ideals.
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